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Introduction 
 
Joining Forces: Necessary Steps for 
Developing the Comprehensive Approach 
Ronja Kempin and Ronja Scheler 
In June 2016 Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission 
(HR/VP), will unveil the new EU Global Strategy. The document succeeds the European 
Security Strategy of 2003. One important concern associated with this initiative is to 
develop the EU’s “comprehensive approach” into a “joined-up approach”. For that to 
succeed, the EEAS and the Commission will have to formally define who sets the EU’s 
priorities, makes decisions, and enforces these on the ground; regional strategies will 
need to be immediately backed up by action plans. The EEAS should appoint a repre-
sentative for the implementation of regional strategies having the requisite authority 
with respect to all EU actors. Finally, the EEAS and the Commission should develop 
“strategic budgets” to fund the priority projects of EU external action in regions for 
which the EU has adopted strategies. 
 
The outcomes of military interventions 
in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s left no 
doubt that stable social and economic 
structures can only be restored after war 
if armed intervention is accompanied by 
reconstruction, development and state-
building processes. Today the “comprehen-
sive approaches” developed in response 
to that realisation enjoy a firm place in 
the foreign policy and security strategies 
of nation-states and international orga-
nisations. 
 
The EU and the Comprehensive 
Approach 
The EU is no exception in this respect. Its 
European Security Strategy of December 
2003 already states that “none of the new 
threats is purely military; nor can any be 
tackled by purely military means”. Ten 
years later, in December 2013, the Euro-
pean Commission and the High Repre-
sentative of the European Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) jointly 
outlined “The EU’s Comprehensive Ap-
proach to External Conflict and Crises”. 
This concept, which has come to be known 
as the “Comprehensive Approach”, requires 
the EU to address “all stages of the cycle of 
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conflict or other external crises” – for 
which the Union has “a wide array of poli-
cies, tools and instruments at its disposal”. 
The central principle is the reciprocal rela-
tionship between security and develop-
ment. 
More broadly, the comprehensive ap-
proach is also supposed to be the central 
organising principle of the EU’s external 
action. In 1993 the Treaty of Maastricht 
divided responsibility for foreign and 
security policy between the Commission 
on the one side and the Council and the 
member states on the other. While the 
Commission continued to be responsible 
for development cooperation, humanitari-
an assistance and external economic rela-
tions, powers relating to foreign, security 
and defence policy were assigned to the 
member states. The fragmentation of re-
sponsibilities, budgets, capabilities and 
instruments associated with this division 
presents obstacles to effective action. The 
establishment of the High Representative 
of the European Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy (under the Treaty of 
Lisbon also Vice-President of the European 
Commission) and the creation of the Euro-
pean External Action Service (EEAS) were 
intended to improve the coherence of exter-
nal action. They are expected to coordinate 
the interests and policies of the member 
states and EU institutions in order to guide 
comprehensive action to success. 
Yet to this day it remains difficult even 
to define the broad outlines of the compre-
hensive approach. There is no generally 
agreed definition of the concept. The EU 
seeks to act comprehensively on foreign 
policy in both institutional terms and con-
tent. Institutionally the challenge consists 
in coordinating the actors and instruments 
of external action. Substantively, the policy 
areas of development and security need to 
be connected. The focus of the present anal-
ysis lies on the thematic and institutional 
interaction of the “Brussels” instances, the 
Commission and the EEAS. The willingness 
of member states to coordinate their na-
tional policies, on the other hand, is not 
addressed. The EEAS and the Commission 
plan and fund EU foreign policy and im-
plement it on the ground. But to date 
research has largely neglected their inter-
actions. The present investigation compares 
EU actions in the Sahel and the Horn of 
Africa, which have both been plagued by 
decades of crisis and conflict. In both re-
gions the EU claims to have been pursuing 
comprehensive foreign policy since 2011. 
In response to growing security challenges, 
the EU has stepped up its engagement in 
both regions since 2008/09, using numer-
ous instruments from various policy areas. 
It also published regional strategies – 
“Strategy for Security and Development in 
the Sahel” and “A Strategic Framework for 
the Horn of Africa” – in September and 
November 2011 respectively. 
If the Commission and the EEAS succeed 
in cooperating with one another and in 
combining security with development 
when formulating their strategy (goals) and 
budget for action (means), they are acting 
coherently. As a consequence, this leads 
us to assess whether security and develop-
ment aspects were adequately reflected and 
integrated in the formulation of strategy. 
Secondly, the question arises whether and 
to what extent the responsible EU institu-
tions are included in this process and to 
what extent they exercise their coordinat-
ing functions. The same applies to the 
budget. Alongside institutional and policy 
coordination, it is also relevant whether 
development and security budgets are 
coordinated such as to be able to connect 
short-, medium- and long-term foreign 
policy initiatives. Finally, the institutions 
will be examined more closely as they im-
plement EU foreign policy on the ground. 
The institutional coherence of the Com-
mission and the EEAS will be measured by 
their ability to avoid parallel structures 
and establish clear reporting lines and 
responsibilities. 
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Strategy 
The EU’s “Strategy for Security and Develop-
ment in the Sahel” and “Strategic Frame-
work for the Horn of Africa” both tie to-
gether the policy areas of security and 
development. This is reflected in the “key 
issues” named in the documents. The Sahel 
Strategy aims (1) to promote development, 
good governance and internal conflict reso-
lution in the cooperating countries and 
(2) to support them in cooperating more 
closely on matters of security and develop-
ment. It also seeks (3) to build capacities 
to improve security and rule of law, and 
(4) to contain and prevent violent extrem-
ism and radicalisation. The “Strategic 
Framework for the Horn of Africa” sets out 
to (1) assist the countries in the region in 
establishing “robust and accountable poli-
tical structures”. The EU will also (2) “work 
with the countries of the region and with 
international organisations … to resolve 
current conflicts, particularly in Somalia 
and Sudan, and avoid future potential con-
flicts between or within countries”. In the 
short and medium term, the EU aims (3) to 
ensure that “the insecurity in the region 
does not threaten the security of others 
beyond its borders, e.g. through piracy, 
terrorism or irregular migration”. Finally, 
the EU wishes (4) to promote economic 
growth in the states of the Horn of Africa 
and (5) strengthen regional political and 
economic cooperation and the role of re-
gional economic communities. 
Deeper analysis of the two documents 
reveals an important difference: The Sahel 
Strategy focuses strongly on the issue of 
“security”. Although noting at the begin-
ning that security in the Sahel cannot be 
separated from development, it becomes 
clear that the strategy is fundamentally 
driven by security concerns. It explicitly 
focuses “primarily on the countries most 
affected by common security challenges”, 
and the challenges named in the document 
are largely security-related. Any linkage 
with development or diplomatic questions 
is largely rhetorical and consigned to the 
preamble. Unlike the Sahel, the Horn of 
Africa has been viewed through a “strategic 
lens” by the EU institutions already since 
October 2006. That was when the Commis-
sion proposed establishing an “EU regional 
political partnership for peace, security and 
development in the Horn of Africa” to the 
Council and the European Parliament. The 
EU’s strategic focus was initially directed 
towards Somalia, identifying its symptoms 
of crisis as causal for volatility across the 
entire Horn of Africa. Brussels accordingly 
sought to tackle these. Over the course of 
time the scope has also expanded to ad-
dress the problems of the region as a whole, 
giving equal attention to the issues of de-
velopment and security. This prior involve-
ment has benefited the Strategic Frame-
work, which balances the areas of develop-
ment and security. Since the publication 
of the text both have continued to develop 
symmetrically. In October 2015 the agenda 
was broadened. The “Horn of Africa Re-
gional Action Plan 2015–2020” adds three 
challenges to the strategy: the influence of 
“the wider region”, “violent radicalisation” 
and “migration, refugees and internally 
displaced persons”. 
Institutional cooperation between EEAS 
and Commission in drafting the two strat-
egy documents can also be regarded as 
largely coherent. The Sahel Strategy was 
conceived under the auspices of the EEAS, 
in coordination with the Commission. It is 
a consequence of growing worries about 
the political, security and humanitarian 
situation in the region. The French Council 
Presidency placed the Sahel on the Euro-
pean agenda in 2008 and set the strategy 
process rolling. In 2009 and 2010 the EU 
sent fact-finding missions to Mali, Maurita-
nia, Algeria and Niger, to investigate and 
identify the challenges and needs in each 
of these countries. The findings flowed into 
the document that the Council welcomed 
in March 2011 as a “Strategy for Security 
and Development in the Sahel” and came 
into effect on 21 September 2011. The 
“Strategic Framework for the Horn of 
Africa” was also prepared by the EEAS, 
under the auspices of its then Director for 
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Africa, Nick Westcott, and the Horn of Afri-
ca division. The document was preceded by 
two strategy papers: the Commission’s 
Africa Strategy published in October 2006 
and “An EU Policy on the Horn of Africa – 
Towards a Comprehensive Strategy” 
adopted in 2009 under the Swedish Coun-
cil Presidency. Those two documents re-
flected institutional rivalries in the area of 
EU external relations, and it was not until 
2011 that the EEAS and the Commission 
succeeded in uniting the diverse objectives. 
It appears that the EEAS’s interfacing func-
tion played a particularly crucial role in 
bringing all the institutions involved in the 
EU’s foreign policy into this process. One 
reason for the EEAS’s engagement may have 
been that the regional strategies were wel-
come opportunities to establish the new 
institution’s role and position. 
All in all, the EU operates largely coher-
ently on strategy formulation, both institu-
tionally and substantively. The verdict for 
the “Strategic Framework for the Horn of 
Africa” is the more positive of the two. 
Especially in the Horn of Africa, the EEAS 
and the Commission have succeeded in 
bringing together previously diverging 
priorities and giving equal weight to de-
velopment and security. The EEAS’s inter-
facing function has proven its worth. At the 
same time it is important to integrate the 
Commission closely into the process of 
formulating strategy. It possesses the fi-
nancing instruments needed for implemen-
tation and contributes the development 
component that has been side-lined in the 
Sahel under pressure from the member 
states. 
Budget 
The analysis of budgetary coherence pro-
duces quite different findings. Here it is 
most noticeable that the funds supplied 
by the Commission and the EEAS for im-
plementation of the goals agreed in the 
strategies flow from different sources. The 
two most important are the European 
Development Fund (EDF) and the Multian-
nual Financial Framework (MFF), which in-
cludes the budget of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP). Both run on 
seven-year cycles, currently 2014–2020. 
Analysis of the EDF programmes shows 
that the priorities and recipients of EU 
development funding differ from country 
to country. Whereas more “classical” de-
velopment projects (education, health and 
infrastructure) dominate in some states in 
both the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, else-
where the EU directs a large part of its 
bilateral development funding towards 
strengthening and stabilising state struc-
tures. In both the Sahel and the Horn of 
Africa, the focus of bilateral EU develop-
ment cooperation is slanted towards agri-
culture and food security. The security 
support measures vary. Here it is noticeable 
that the Sahel countries receive considera-
ble financial aid for projects and measures 
in the areas of state- and peace-building and 
good governance, with EDF funds flowing 
to Mali, Niger, Mauretania, Burkina Faso 
and Chad. In the Horn of Africa only Soma-
lia and Uganda receive European funding 
in the area of security. In parallel to na-
tional programmes, the EU also concludes 
Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs) 
under the EDF. Here – in contrast to the 
priorities of bilateral EU development co-
operation – most of the Brussels funding 
for the countries of the Horn of Africa is 
earmarked for regional cooperation in the 
area of “peace, security and regional sta-
bility”. About half of the u80 million bud-
get of the EDF’s regional programme for 
Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the 
Indian Ocean is dedicated to that complex. 
The RIP for West Africa contains u1.15 
billion for sixteen countries. The funds are 
largely intended for promoting regional 
economic integration and supporting 
regional trade. The EU also maintains a 
separate budget for implementing the 
Sahel Strategy, with an additional u660 
million for promoting security and develop-
ment there. 
The MFF for 2014 to 2020 provides 
u163.1 million for the Sahel, of which 
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about u40 million falls to the Instrument 
contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) 
and u21 million to the Development Coop-
eration Instrument (DCI); the civilian mis-
sions of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUCAP 
Sahel Mali, are funded from the CFSP bud-
get in the MFF. The shared costs of the only 
military mission in the Sahel, EUTM Mali, 
are channelled through the ATHENA mech-
anism and amount to u27.7 million for the 
24-month mandate. The overall MFF budget 
of u250 million for the Horn of Africa in-
cludes about u26.6 million for the DCI and 
u3.8 million for the IcSP. The CFSP part of 
the budget primarily funds the missions 
and operations in the region (EUCAP Nes-
tor, EUTM Somalia and EUNAVFOR Somalia 
– Operation Atalanta). 
Responsibility for institutional steering 
of the financing mechanisms is shared in 
the planning (Commission and EEAS) and 
administration (Commission) of the EU 
development aid programmes. The crucial 
role played by the Commission in funding 
EU policies, however, raises questions as 
to how coherently the actors (can) act. The 
Commission is the decisive instance in 
planning and defining individual budget 
titles and is responsible for managing the 
budget, while the EEAS’s function is ex-
clusively preparatory. Although the EEAS 
was central in preparing both regional 
strategies, it possesses little in the way of 
resources for implementation. Instead 
the Commission oversees the priorities of 
bilateral cooperation with the states of the 
respective region and defines the financial 
framework for the corresponding measures. 
It manages the EU’s collective EDF develop-
ment aid without any participation by the 
EEAS. It is furthermore conspicuous that 
EDF and MFF projects are not coordinated, 
even though the Commission manages 
both budgets. That is all the more surpris-
ing given that the two main instruments 
pursue partly similar goals, with common 
points of reference and identical seven-year 
planning cycles. 
But even within the funds there is a lack 
of coordination: In the MFF the budget for 
foreign policy is strictly separate from that 
for development (budget titles 19 “Foreign 
policy instruments” and 21 “Development 
and cooperation”). Moreover, in the sphere 
of peace and security the CSDP missions 
and operations are not connected with 
longer-term budget lines, such as the IcSP 
or the EDF security sector reform pro-
grammes. This division is especially sur-
prising given the EU’s widely touted com-
prehensive approach. 
Finally, the analysis underlines that the 
EEAS and the Commission are not basing 
their practical measures in the Sahel and 
the Horn of Africa on the regional strate-
gies. The foreign policy and development 
budgets do not conform to the EU’s prior-
ities as laid out in the two documents. 
Here the EU is still a long way from its 
aim of coherent action. Four problems are 
especially obvious. While the EEAS is con-
sulted over budget priorities for EU exter-
nal actions, the negotiation of bilateral and 
regional programmes under the EDF takes 
place without it. Here the Commission 
alone interacts with individual states and 
regional organisations. Secondly, the EEAS 
possesses virtually no resources of its own, 
and thus lacks the ability to exert opera-
tional influence, for example in imple-
menting regional strategy priorities in the 
Sahel or the Horn of Africa. Thirdly, the 
treaty arrangement under which the Com-
mission manages the EU’s most important 
foreign policy and development budgets 
means that they are dominated by develop-
ment programme lines. There is no balance 
between security and development. Finally, 
the fact that as yet no coherence exists 
between EDF and MFF is also a problem: 
funded programmes and measures are 
often almost identical, while initiatives 
with short-, medium- and long-term effects 
are not sensibly connected or coordinated. 
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Institutional Cooperation 
Numerous actors are involved in imple-
menting policy in the Sahel and the Horn 
of Africa. Almost all the EU institutions 
maintain desks or posts dealing with the 
countries of these two regions. In the EEAS, 
the West Africa division is responsible for 
relations with the Sahel. A Sahel coordina-
tor functions as the link between the rele-
vant desks and departments. The EEAS has 
also established a Sahel task force for inter-
institutional coordination, comprising the 
relevant EEAS desks, the relevant Commis-
sion services and the EU’s counter-terrorism 
coordinator, meeting as required every four 
to six weeks. But rather than discussing 
concrete policies, this forum usually con-
centrates on fundamental questions of 
strategic and political orientation. Another 
instrument of institutional coordination is 
the so-called Crisis Platform, which is con-
vened when urgent action is required. It is 
chaired by the HR/VP, the EEAS Executive 
Secretary General or the Managing Director 
for Crisis Response; meetings are attended 
as required by representatives of EEAS com-
mittees and departments, the EU Military 
Committee and/or the services of the Com-
mission. Within the Commission several 
Directorates-General (DGs) are responsible 
for policies in the region: At DG Trade, 
Directorate D (Sustainable Development, 
Economic Partnership Agreements – Afri-
can, Caribbean and Pacific, Agri-food and 
Fisheries) regulates EU trade policy towards 
African states. At the DG for International 
Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) 
Unit E2 (Development Coordination and 
Regional Cooperation West Africa) manages 
development cooperation with the region; 
finally, at the DG for Humanitarian Aid and 
Civil Protection (ECHO), Unit B3 (West and 
Central Africa) is responsible for the Sahel. 
Like the EEAS, DG DEVCO and ECHO also 
have Sahel coordinators. 
As far as the Horn of Africa is concerned, 
inter-institutional cooperation in Brussels 
is less developed. The EEAS and the Com-
mission naturally have departments for 
the Horn of Africa. The EEAS has a Horn of 
Africa, Eastern Africa and Indian Ocean 
desk; in the Commission, DG ECHO Unit B2 
(Eastern and Southern Africa, Great Lakes) 
and DG DEVCO Units D1 (Development 
Coordination Southern Africa and Indian 
Ocean) and D2 (Development Coordination 
East Africa and Regional Cooperation in 
Eastern and Southern Africa) deal with this 
region. But so far there is no inter-institu-
tional coordinating task force for EU activi-
ties in the Horn of Africa. The establish-
ment of such a body is proposed in the 
Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015–
2020. 
Policies and projects are implemented 
on the ground by EU delegations. Originally 
under the Commission’s DG for External 
Relations (RELEX), organisational responsi-
bility for the delegations shifted to the 
EEAS and the HR/VP in 2011, after the Trea-
ty of Lisbon came into effect. This has seen 
them acquire new tasks and functions; 
their traditional focus on development 
questions has now been expanded to the 
areas of security and peace. Their staff are 
composed of Commission officials and 
national and European diplomats. The 
“Working Arrangement between Commis-
sion Services and the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) Services in Relation 
to External Relations Issues” of 13 January 
2012 regulates relations between the EU 
delegations, the EEAS and the Commission. 
The heads of delegations receive instruc-
tions from the HR/VP, from the EEAS and 
from the Commission, and report to the 
HR/VP, the President of the Commission, 
the Commissioners involved in foreign 
policy matters, the Commission services 
and the EEAS. 
Working relations between the EEAS and 
the Commission are also formally regulat-
ed. The Council’s so-called EEAS Decision 
contains additional rules and measures 
designed to enhance coordination. Finally, 
there is also a vademecum intended to 
facilitate cooperation between Commission 
officials and their EEAS counterparts. But 
the existence of these documents cannot 
prevent the duplication of structures, nor 
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ongoing lack of clarity in reporting lines. 
The call of the cited Working Arrangements 
to include all involved actors in all coordi-
nation processes creates considerable work 
and effort. The details remain unclear, 
and lie in the discretion of the involved in-
stances. The greatest doubts concern what 
occurs in the event of conflict of interest. 
The role of the EU Special Representa-
tives (EUSRs), which are active in both 
regions, also remains unresolved. The task 
of EUSRs Angel Losada and Alexander 
Rondos is to guide and coordinate Europe-
an efforts in their regions, the Sahel and 
the Horn of Africa respectively. They may 
make proposals for improving the coor-
dination of the various EU instruments, for 
example in the form of sub-strategies and 
action plans. The SHARE initiative in the 
Horn of Africa, which supplied substantial 
added value, was a proposal by EUSR 
Rondos. The EUSRs owe their freedom to 
launch weighty political initiatives to their 
unclear institutional position. They report 
directly to the HR/VP, but are not part of 
the EEAS. Instead they are one of the most 
important foreign policy instruments of 
the EU member states. This configuration 
creates parallel structures, impedes the 
coherent implementation of policies, and 
generates tensions. In the Sahel, for exam-
ple, the member states preferred to bypass 
the responsible EEAS coordinator and 
instead work with the special representa-
tive, who did not have to coordinate with 
the institutional structure. Nor are the 
relationships between EUSRs and EU dele-
gations clearly regulated. There is neither 
a division of tasks, nor a hierarchical rela-
tionship between the different positions. 
Conclusions 
The EU will only be able to live up to its 
ideal of coherent action if the EEAS and 
the Commission formally define responsi-
bility for setting the priorities of EU action, 
making decisions and implementing them 
on the ground. Our findings suggest three 
measures for developing the comprehen-
sive approach: Firstly, it would appear sen-
sible to back the regional strategies with 
immediate action plans. Although such 
documents exist for the investigated re-
gions, they appeared four years after the 
strategies. Secondly, in parallel to the 
obligatory preparation of action plans, the 
EEAS should appoint an “EU Representative 
for the Implementation of Regional Strat-
egies” having the requisite authority with 
respect to all EU actors. Finally, the EEAS 
and the Commission should develop “strat-
egic budgets” to fund the priority projects 
of EU external action in regions for which 
the EU has adopted strategies. These bud-
gets should be detached from the rules 
governing the MFF and the EDF, and would 
be used to fund short- to long-term multi-
disciplinary programmes prepared and 
managed jointly by the EEAS and the Com-
mission. 
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